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PREFACE
The papers included in this collection, published in two 
volumes, were prepared to assist the Study Group which the 
Commonwealth Secretary-General set up early this year in response 
to a request by Commonwealth Finance Ministers for an overall 
examination of the international trade and payments system. The 
Group, headed by Professor Gerry Helleiner of the University of 
Toronto, comprised nine eminent experts in finance and trade, 
drawn from a wide range of Commonwealth countries. The Group 
met four times during January-July 1983 and their report was 
submitted to Commonwealth Governments in August 1983 and published 
for general circulation in September 1983 under the title 
"Towards a New Bretton Woods: Challenges for the World Financial 
and Trading System".
Many of the papers were prepared, on request, by disting­
uished people with specialised knowledge of the functioning of the 
international economic system. These often contain not only an 
analysis of the relevant problems, as the respective authors 
see them, but also fairly specific policy proposals. In addition, 
the Secretariat prepared a large number of background papers which 
represented an effort to present in summary form relevant infor­
mation and analyses on the principal issues pertinent to the 
Group's terms of reference. Some of these papers are also 
included in these volumes.
The main subject areas covered by the papers are: the state 
of the world economy; the problems of specific country groups 
in the areas under consideration; the evolution and functioning 
of the international finance and trade institutions, particularly 
the IMF and the World Bank Group; special issues concerning 
official and private financial flows; and probiems in the inter­
national trading system.
While the papers are not the product of any major new 
research effort, which would not have been possible in the short 
time available, it was felt that they would nevertheless be of 
interest to a wider audience than the Study Group for which they 
were written. Knowledge of their availability has already 
generated considerable demand for some of the papers. It should 
be noted that no attempt has been made to edit or revise these 
papers to any significant extent in the light of subsequent 
developments. However, obvious errors have been corrected and 
figures updated either by the Secretariat or the authors them­
selves. Rosemary Minto and S.K. Rao were responsible for the 
detailed editorial work and Qamar Siddiqi provided supervisiory 
assi stance.
On behalf of the Secretariat and the Study Group, I would 
like to express my gratitude to the authors for* their willing and 
expeditious response to requests to produce papers at short notice 
and for the useful contribution this background effort made to 
the analyses and recommendations contained in the Group's Report.
Finally, I must emphasise that the conclusions expressed 
in the papers remain those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of members of the Study Group, the Commonwealth 
Secretariat or Commonwealth Governments.
B. Persaud 
Director and Head 
Economic Affairs Division
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THE CRISIS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY - SOME THOUGHTS ON 
THE SITUATION TODAY AND IN THE I1JTRTIES
R.C. Wanigatunga 
Commonwealth Secretariat
"Economics still does not allow final answers on these 
matters. But as usual, something can be said." J.K. Galbraith 
in The Great Crash.
I . Introduction
There is mounting anxiety that the world economy is 
currently in the throes of a recession.! which could well 
escalate into a severe depression similar to that which 
bedevilled most countries in the inter-war period.
It is perhaps useful briefly to see the background to 
the current recession and then examine its salient features 
and attempt to assess its possible causes. The policies 
adopted to deal with it are also relevant . The inter war
period is treated likewise. Finally, a brief comparison of 
the two periods is made.
In both periods, what is being dealt with is a malaise 
of the developed market economies, which has, of course, had 
severe repercussions for the rest of the world, none more so 
than the developing countries considered as a group. The 
developed market economies, led by the US, account for much 
of world income and trade and their dominance was pven greater 
in the 20s and 30s (Table l).
I I . The Current Recession
The background
The post Korean war period up to the mid 60s saw a 
rapid rate of growth of world income and of world trade 
(tables 2-4 ): the latter was greatly assisted by trade
liberalisation in industrialised countries (albeit concentrated 
on intra-regional 'Western European trade) and the "convertibility 
of major currencies. In the developed economies, the numbers 
in employment rose sharply and the rate of unemployment 
remained low (Table 5)j while the general level of prices rose 
only mildly. This period was also characterised for the most 
part by a high and sustained level of aggregate demand, at a 
level very often' approximately that necessary to maintain 
"full employment", partly as a result of the following of 
"Keynesian"economic policies jV in most countries, and 
rising real expenditure on dur¿able consumer and "public" goods.
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RECOVERY, SURVIVAL AND THE INTERNATIONAI 
MONETARY SYSTEM: NOTES TOWARDS INITIAL REFORMS
Reginald Herbold Green 
Institute of Development Studies 
LLpjversity of Sussex
Credit is suspicion asleep.
- H. Wallich, 1982
The external deficits of the developing countries 
have reached record levels.
Of those that are net importers of oil, half now 
face current account deficits of 1 2 per cent of 
gross domestic product or more - about three times 
their level of a decade ago. Deficits of this 
magnitude clearly cannot be sustained in terms of 
future debt service capacity.
- J. de Larosiere, 19 S 2
The immediate financial problems of the banks 
should never be allowed to conceal the more funda­
mental political consequences in countries which 
face severe contraction and lower living standards 
as a result of their losses of foreign exchange 
and debt burdens.
- Brandt Commission, 1983
Successful adjustment to worsened terms of trade 
requires an expansion of investment rather than a 
contraction in demand; otherwise the underlying 
disequilibrium will be suppressed rather than 
corrected, resulting in damage to the development 
process without removing the prospect of renewed 
payments pressure in the future. Adjustment through 
growth implies a need for time to make the 
adjustment - and hence, bridging finance - as well 
as additional capacities - and hence, long-term 
resources from abroad.
- UNCTAD Group of 
Experts on Low-Income 
Countries and The 
Internat ional 
Monetary System, 19S3
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The Tnternational Monetary System: Elements of Pa tho logy ?
The international monetary and financial system 
is not operating satisfactorily. For about a decade and a 
half it has lurched into crises, been patched up, had brief 
returns to apparent good working order and lurched again.
The underlying structural trend has been negative. In 
these aspects it has paralleled the global economy in pro­
longed recession - over 1 9 7 9 / 8 2  more plausibly titled 
depression. Arguably, therefore, the monetary/finaneia1 
system's weaknesses are neither surprising nor a basic 
cause of 1909-1982 global economic evolution. However, as 
of 1 9 8 3 the state of the international monetary and 
financial system is such as to give real cause for fear 
that it will by its weaknesses precipitate a further crisis - 
especially but not only for peripheral economies - and/or 
abort the nascent or tentative recovery apparently 
beginning in some OECD and NIC economies.
A quick catalogue of weaknesses must begin with 
the International Monetary Fund because - despite its 
limited resources and the record low level of its quotas 
relative to international liquidity - it has regained a 
central role in countries' external financial adjustment.
This is not so much through its own resources - critical as 
these are to economies with very limited access to commercial 
finance. Rather it turns on an increased tendency for the 
World Bank, Paris and London Clubs (rescheduling), bilateral 
donors and commercial banks to perceive an IMF programme as 
a sine qua non for any major adjustment-supporting action on 
their part.
The Fund is not performing this role very well - 
at least not if being widely accepted as a counsellor, being 
able to meet a substantial portion of short- to medium-term 
bridging finance needs and contributing to adjustment pre­
dominantly through increased supply (e.g. of exports, 
food, energy) to reduce external imbalance are seen as 
criteria. First, its resources are too limited to meet 
more than a small proportion of the additional finance 
required - under a third even for least developed and 
other poor or structurally disadvantaged economies (e.g.
Sierra Leone, India, Mauritius respectively). Secondly, 
and partly as a result, its programmes are still too short­
term - with respect to drawing and to repayment - to 
permit adjustment through increasing supply to close 
structural imbalances. This is especially true on the 
repayment side since an IMF drawing programme is likely to 
prove unworkable in the year immediately after drawings cease 
and in the peak repayment years even if substantial structural 
change toward balance is being achieved. Thirdly, and again
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partly related to both of the previous factors, the IMF's 
model programme assumes excessive growth Gf demand as the 
basic cause of crisis and reduction of that demand as the 
cure. In cases of economies in long-term structural 
crises (e.g. Ghana and, for different reasons, Uganda), 
suffering from sustained weakness in the purchasing power 
of their exports (e.g. Zambia, Mauritius) or savaged by 
the 1 9 7 9 - 8 2  international economic depression following 
successful weathering of 1 9 7 3 - 7 5  (e.g. Kenya, Tanzania,
Malawi, Swaziland) the causal factor behind imbalance is 
not excessive expansion of demand. Rather contraction of 
the capacity to import, to maintain capital stock and to 
sustain agricultural production growth equal to that of 
population are central. Especially when real resources per 
capita are already very low, attempting to solve these supply- 
side problems by generalised demand cuts is humanly 
destructive, politically extremely destabilising and - 
except perhaps in the very short run - economically 
ineffective.
As a direct consequence of these three weaknesses, 
there is a fourth. Many countries do not consider the Fund 
to be a reliable partner in adjustment nor a credible source 
of political economic analysis and advice. As a result, 
approaches to the Fund with respect to high conditionality 
drawings are delayed, negotiations on programmes are inter­
minably protracted and "agreed" programmes and targets 
conceal such divergent perceptions and goals as to raise the 
number and speed of breakdowns. Given the evident need of 
many economies for bridging finance during structural 
adjustment, the cost of delaying action while the objective 
position deteriorates and the increasing tendencyiof the 
World Bank, bilateral donors and commercial banks to wait 
for a Fund programme, the price of such delay is high as 
evidenced in cases as varied as Brazil and Tanzania.
Both the World Bank and bilateral aid agencies have 
increasingly tended to accept the Fund's analysis of 
developing economy crises. This may not be true at the 
intellectual level - their basic thrust is toward increasing 
supply and their time frame of reference much longer. It 
is true in terms of their unwillingness to consider providing 
substantial additional resource transfers prior to conclusion 
of an IMF programme even when the country puts forward a 
reasoned alternative set of proposals. Their effectiveness 
is further limited by two additional characteristics - 
relatively slow response (e.g. beginning serious negotia­
tions only after a Fund programme is agreed rather than in 
parallel) and very high commitment to project (new capital 
stock), as opposed to programme (interim maintenance for and 
increased utilisation of existing capital stock), lending 
as exemplified by the Bank's 10 per cent limit on programme 
lending as a share of the total.
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Commercial banks - whose 1970s recycling; did much 
to sustain Third World growth over 1973-78 and to delay 
the post-1979 descent into stagnation (or negative growth) - 
have swung from excessive (at least ex post) optimism to 
self-validating pessimism. If imbalance is to be overcome 
largely by increased supply this requires additional 
finance in the interim (not reduced exposure by the banks) 
and attempts to reduce or reverse net lending will maximise 
losses to the banks as well as the costs of economic 
decline to the borrowers. (The positive scenario also 
requires expanding - not contracting as over 1 9 8 1 /' 8 2 - 
world trade and increasing - not decreasing as over the 
past decade - market access for both primary and processed 
commodity exporters and NICs. That, however, is a topic 
for another study.)
Rescheduling - like IMF programming - is too short­
term and too little oriented towards supply enhancement. 
Relatively short breathing spaces and increased interest 
rates increase the likelihood of programmes' becoming unstuck 
(especially as they leave little or no margin for adverse 
future external events and, indeed, usually are over 
optimistic on attainable exports, requisite imports and terms 
of trade). They are not businesslike because their over­
caution increases probable total future losses for borrowers 
and lenders alike.
Crisis Containment, Recovery Reinforcement: International
Financial Requisites
Crisis containment requires halting the decline of 
import capacity and real per capita national purchasing 
power which most poor, many NIC and middle- to upper-income 
peripheral and some high-income industrial economies have 
experienced over 1979-82. Unless this is achieved five 
sets of consequences are likely to ensue:
1 . continued contraction of world trade because 
poor and intermediate economies cannot 
sustain present real import levels;
2 . consequential renewed depressionary pressure 
on the world economy as a whole (reversing 
the 1 9 7 0 s positive contribution from 
surprisingly sustained rises in developing 
economy and NIC imports and, thus, in OECD 
exports to them);
3. increased social and political instability 
leading either to immobilisme or violent 
change in a significant number of developing 
countries;
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4- major forced defaults to commercial banks, 
governments, the World Bank and the IMF by 
pauperised economies - especially among the 
least developed and among African and island 
economies more generally;
5. substantial consequences of default both in 
terms of the cost of Northern salvage 
operations (presumably the 1930s spiralling 
collapse pattern would be averted - at a price) 
and of further damage to normal global trade 
and trade-oriented production finance.
The dangers of such a scenario developing are 
greatest with respect to two groups of economies: the NICs
and the least developed/structurally disadvantaged. In the 
case of the NICs the primary problems are the present 
levels of debt outstanding, its short average life, record 
real interest rates and sluggish export growth. The prime 
requirements for averting crises are avoidance of panic 
by banks, lengthening average debt maturity, sharply lower 
real (as well as nominal) interest rates and both a recovery 
of global trade and at least a gradual reversal of the new 
protectionism.
The case of the least developed/structurally disad­
vantaged is more serious. The post-1979 collapse of real 
import capacity related to radically worsened terms of 
trade and (partly consequential) export volume falls has 
created structural imbalances, human misery and a deterio­
ration of productive capacity both worse and far less 
readily reversible than in the NICs. While debt service - 
often from desperate use of supplier credit and bank loans 
to lessen the pace of the 1 9 7 9 - 1 9 8 1  decline on the unwise, 
but hardly unique, view that global recovery would come in 
1 9 8 1 - 8 2  as it had in 1 9 7 6 - 7 7  - is 2 0 to 4 0 per cent of 
export earnings, for many of these economies their basic 
problem is import strangulation. Maintenance of existing 
capital stock and utilisation of installed capacity (in 
agriculture and transport, health and education as well as 
in manufacturing) is impossible at present import levels 
even though these give rise to unmanageable current account 
deficits. Domestically the cumulative output declines 
create recurrent budget deficits (with erosion of import 
and export duty, sales tax and company tax bases), cost- 
push inflation (from reduced capacity utilisation), profi­
teering (whether on parallel markets or legally), and 
physical lack of incentive goods to make nominal increases 
in anyone's income (especially that of peasants whose 
basic purchases are simple domestic or imported manufactured 
goods) effective in real terms. In human terms
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malnutrition and de facto unemployment are rising, the 
quality of education and health care eroding, and personal 
purchasing power declining to levels below those of the 
1900s. This pattern is affecting previously middle-income 
economies (e.g. Mauritius, Jamaica) as well as least 
developed (e.g. Malawi, Bangladesh) and those which 
weathered their 1973-75 crises and regained apparently 
stable growth by 1977 (e.g., Kenya, Tanzania) as well as 
those with longer-term negative economic patterns (e.g. Ghana, 
Zambia). The pattern is most severe and uniform in Africa - 
where in normal economic terms only Botswana of all 
Commonwealth members has been able to retain manageable 
internal and external balance and a forward, albeit slowed, 
development dynamic. But it is not unique to that continent.
A majority of Caribbean and several Pacific and Asian 
economies exhibit similar symptoms of descent into economic 
disintegration enforced by declining import capacity.
In many of these cases global trade revival alone 
will not be enough to restore manageable current account 
balance even if it brings some terms-of-trade improvement. 
For economies like those of Swaziland, Kenya, Malawi, 
Tanzania and Mauritius one would need to assume a doubling 
of the real price of coffee, sugar, tea, oilseeds and cotton 
relative to fuel and manufactures to project restoration of 
early 1970s (or 1977) current account ratios without radical 
export-increasing and import-substituting structural shifts. 
Similarly, in cases of prolonged non-maintenance of directly 
productive and infrastructural capital - e.g. Uganda and 
Ghana - no trade recovery or debt deferral scenario can 
lead to economic viability without sustained additional 
external resource injections to rehabilitate and replace 
run-down or destroyed capital stock.
Because this group of economies - unlike the NICs - 
requires substantially increased net resource transfers, 
in most cases has little access to commercial finance, will 
not respond rapidly or automatically to trade recovery and - 
even taken together - poses no comparable threat to the 
global banking system to that of a Mexico or even a South 
Korea, it is in danger of being overlooked or set aside.
In human terms the cost would be appalling; even in terms 
of averting additional strains on the global financial system 
and on industrial economy (not least United Kingdom) exports 
they would be severe.
Overal1,developing economies lost about $ 8 5 billion 
in import purchasing power between 1 9 8 0 and 1 9 8 2 : $ 4 0  
billion from export falls, $ 3 7  billion from increased debt 
service and $ 1 0  billion from falling medium-term borrowing. 
Short-term borrowing increases of $25 billion merely rolled
forward part of the increase in debt service while worsening 
average maturity and future debt service patterns. Despite 
import cuts average external reserves fell to under two-and- 
a-half months' imports by the start of 1 9 8 2 and almost 
certainly under two months' by its end, with the African 
position of reserves (under one month's imports) markedly 
worse in both cases. The symptoms of this deterioration as 
they buffet the international financial and monetary system 
are very apparent. About forty countries have serious 
payments arrears with respect to normal commercial credit 
for goods and services. For Nigeria the total is said to 
be $5,000 million and for much small Zambia over $500 million. 
Almost as many are falling into serious (in terms of volume 
and length of delay) arrears on government and government- 
guaranteed borrowing, e.g. $ 7 5  million in the case of 
Tanzania. For some low-income countries - e.g. Zamiba, 
Tanzania - commercial, export credit and government arrears 
exceed recent annual export totals.
In terms of national economies the costs can be 
traced in falling per capita GDP (for four successive years 
in the case of Kenya, which prior to 1978 had an average 
post-independence per capita real growth rate of about 2 . 5  
per cent a year) and in soaring recurrent budget deficits 
related to falling real revenues despite rising tax rates 
(10 per cent of 1982 GDP for Tanzania in 1982/83, a fourth 
consecutive deficit following a sustained 1 9 6 1 /6 2 - 1 9 7 7 ^ 7 8  
record of small to moderate recurrent surpluses). In human 
terms they mean falling purchasing power of peasants, wage 
earners, civil servants and most managers and small 
businessmen; deteriorating transport and housing; 
increasingly inadequate health, education and water services; 
shortages, searches and queues to get even (or especially) 
basic goods; parallel markets and profiteers; erosion of 
hope that decline will be reversed and of effective 
incentives to produce more. This is assuredly not a stable 
base for even a part of global recovery and can all too 
easily become a serious threat fo the whole of it.
With respect to recovery the same points apply. 
Sustaining and broadening the base of recovery - especially 
in Northern capital and basic intermediate goods industries - 
at the least would be much easier if Southern import 
capacity were once again rising and might well prove impossi­
ble were it to continue to fall.
For the NICs (including Hong Kong and Singapore), 
plus high-income natural-resource-based economies like 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand, global recovery in trade 
in manufactured goods and a renewal of demand for natural- 
resource-based products may be sufficient as well as
necessary to restore growth of import capacity. To some 
decree this may also pertain to very large poor economies - 
e.g. India - and to several crisis-hit lower-middle-income 
ones - e.g. Malaysia, Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago, Zimbabwe. 
However, even in these cases there are two caveats: it will
be necessary to avoid crises resulting from current debt 
and to bridge cash flow lags on the trade upswing.
To assume that recovery in the North and in world 
trade will by itself overcome all major debt problems is 
mindlessly optimistic. The recent USA report, "Approach 
to the International Debt Situation: A Policy Overview",
can be read to suggest such an outturn but only if four 
assumptions are made:
1. no short-term Third World debt crises 
before recovery takes hold;
2 . no binding social and political limits to 
additional austerity;
3 . inflation and interest rates held at (brought 
down to) relatively low levels;
4* sustained 4-2 per cent growth in OECD GDP.
Each of these assumptions seems rather optimistic 
taken by itself. As a joint set of necessary conditions 
for a satisfactory resolution of the stresses in the 
international monetary/financial system they appear most 
unlikely to be fulfilled (especially the second and fourth 
conditions) even if interim juggling avoids an intensified 
renewal of 1 9 8 2 commercial bank loan crises which would 
abort both global trade and - probably - industrial economy 
recovery.
For the least developed and a number of other low- 
income economies global recovery by itself will not be 
enough even to sustain present import levels. Their exports 
are on average half of imports, Fund-Bank-bilateral 
resources at present far from fill the gap, access to 
commercial (including export) credit is low and decreasing, 
import levels are already too low to maintain existing 
productive capacity, and export mixes are unlikely to 
benefit massively in volume or price from trade recovery.
Clearly any long-term return to stability and 
growth in these countries does depend on their rehabili­
tating previous export capacity and expanding those 
traditional exports with plausible market prospects. Even 
that will require substantial programme support for inputs
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into production, transport and processing and into incentive 
goods to validate nominal increases in grower prices or 
wages. Beyond that, however, they must identify and 
develop new exports with plausible prospects and markets 
(manufactured or primary products; Northern, Southern or 
regional markets depending on possibilities and contexts). 
That requires more capital goods imports and more consumer 
goods production while output is being built up - and 
more external finance to cover the import gap. In these 
cases neither three nor five years is likely to prove a 
standard period for external balance restructuring. Five 
might do for pure rehabilitation but, given the magnitude 
of the 1 9 7 7 - 8 2  negative external economic parameter 
structural shifts, ten seems more normal as the requisite 
time-period for developing a structurally altered and at 
least doubled (in terms of import purchasing power) export 
mix .
More generally, as the Brandt Commission put it 
earlier this year:
There will in any case be changes in current 
accounts as growth is resumed. To smooth the 
way for joint economic expansion there should 
be general agreement to finance without 
hesitation such growth-induced deficits.
As to the argument that such credit to validate 
increases in real output would be inflationary, the recent 
comment of former IMF Managing Director, H.J. Witteveen, 
is apposite:
With present high unemployment rates and low 
capacity utilisation, surpluses in oil and other 
raw material markets and pervasive deflationary 
pressures in the world financial system, the risk 
that a somewhat higher increase in the money 
supply would rekindle inflation is practically 
nonexistent. This should be explained clearly 
and forcefully to overcome dogmatic and unrealistic 
monetarist fears.
These points would appear to apply even more force­
fully with respect to global credit used to sustain/expand 
basic food, intermediate goods and capital equipment 
imports by developing countries. In the North each 01 these 
sectors is particularly plagued by overcapacity and 
unemployment and particularly unlikely to recover very 
fast purely on the basis of the present modest recovery of 
demand within certain major industrial economies.
35
Wider Still and Wider: Interactions versus Portability
To discuss the international monetary system 
narrowly - excluding major financial flows outside the IMF 
ambit - or in the abstract - outside the 1971-1983 crises 
and the nascent partial recovery - would be unrealistic, 
especially with respect to formulating proposals. The 
international monetary system proper, the IMF, the World 
Bank group, international commercial bank lending and at 
least some aspects of bilateral assistance need to be seen 
together. Finance for survival, adjustment and recovery 
for the low-income and middle-income economies as a group 
and for many individually must be mobilised as a package 
from all of these sources, not limited to one or two.
Moreover, it can be argued that any discussion of 
recovery needs to extend to trade (including terms of trade 
and market access). The problems of those Commonwealth 
countries whose exports cover less than half of imports 
(including invisibles together with goods) cannot be solved 
without very significant increases in the volume, and at 
least stability in the unit purchasing power, of their 
present exports together with structural adjustment into 
new exports. The market access and terms-of-trade evolution 
(more accurately deterioration) of 1 9 7 7 - 1 9 8 2  (rather larger 
for several key metals including copper), if continued, 
make a mockery of any such effort. Similarly, sustained 
renewal of adequate growth in Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand as well as Hong Kong, Singapore and India requires 
a reversal of the rising tide of the new protectionism and 
a less gloomy set of volume/value prospects for natural- 
resource-based products whether in primary, processed or 
manufactured form. Otherwise balance-of-payments support 
will prove a bridge to nowhere and structural adjustment 
finance only extend the range of unutiliseable capacity.
However, with respect to the monetary/financial and 
trade aspects it does seem practicable to make an analytical 
and operational separation for the purpose of sectoral 
discussion and programme exploration. So long as the basic 
need to use finance to sustain trade in the short run and 
to strengthen its foundations in the medium is kept in 
sight together with the parallel need to act on trade access 
and terms issues, it is practicable to discuss monetary and 
financial aspects of crisis containment, adjustment 
augmentation and recovery support separately without 
coupling a detailed analysis and programme of action for 
trade. This is a matter of division of labour with the 
caveat that, as in Adam Smith's pin factory, unless those 
responsible for the other parts of the production process 
carry out their tasks any individual task, however well done 
in and of itself, will prove meaningless.
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Similarly it can be argued that examination of, 
and proposals for, the international monetary and financial 
system should go beyond short-term survival and recovery 
measures toward long-term reforms. Appealing as this 
argument is it suffers from three practical defects:
First, more immediate agreement and action on short­
term measures is potentially attainable than on long-term 
restructuring;
Secondly, even with broader agreement than is now 
in sight, basic restructuring would take several years - 
and without interim steps now would run a very grave risk 
of being swept away in a tide of renewed crisis (like the 1974 
Committee of Twenty Report to the IMF/IBRD);
Thirdly, as with finance/trade, a certain division 
of labour is both practicable and potentially efficient.
This paper posits six basic changes as desirable 
within the international financial system over the next decade 
greater effective participation of all states (especially 
in the Fund and Bank or their successors), transformation 
of the IMF (quantitatively and qualitatively) into a body 
much more analogous to a global central bank, establishing 
the SDR as the basic international reserve asset 
(especially with respect to increases of international 
liquidity), lengthening the average period of bank and other 
international commercial lending, augmenting multinational 
and bilateral concessional resource transfers and concen­
trating them more fully on low-income countries, and 
building up more institutional symmetry especially with 
respect to expanding South-South official and commfercial 
financial institutions and transactions. However, these 
are seen as goals which will only be attainable if increased 
monetary/financial disorder can be averted and recovery 
sustained rather than as immediate points for programmatic 
articulation. The proposals made are seen as consistent 
with, and potentially increasing the attainability of, 
such basic structural reformulations but not as sufficient 
for,nor constituting,them.
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D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n :  C o n t e x t u a l  D i v i s i o n s  w i t h i n  I n c l u s i v e ;
Parameters
Differentiation and equal treatment have - somewhat 
ironically - both d e v e l o p e d  a bad name. The reason seems 
to be that differentiation is perceived to proceed by exclu­
sion and equal treatment to overlook unequal causes, con­
texts and possibilities for change. There is a common 
crisis of the international monetary system. Its resolution 
requires paying attention to the needs and interests of 
major lending centres (e.g. the UK), middle- and high-income 
peripheral economies (e.g. Australia, Canada, Hong Kong,
New Zealand, Singapore), large poor economies (e.g. India 
and in a less crisis- and recession-ridden context Nigeria 
and Zimbabwe) and least developed and/or structurally 
disadvantaged economies (e.g. Antigua, Fiji, Ghana, Jamaica, 
Kenya, Mauritius, Tanzania, Tuvalu and Zambia). Equally 
any resolution must relate dii^ectly to the specific nature 
and causes of each group's - and each individual economy's - 
problems, capacities for adjustment and required time frame 
for adjustment. Differentiation by inclusion, like uniformity 
of treatment in terms of different packages toward common 
recovery and structural adjustment goals, is necessary.
In the case of rich industrial economies which are 
also major financial centres (e.g. the United Kingdom) the 
two principal requirements are avoiding major debt crises 
affecting their financial institutions (as lenders) and 
ensuring adequate flows of credit to developing countries 
to allow increased imports by them to help sustain 
recovery of global trade and production.
For partially industrialised medium- to high-income, 
but basically primary product/natural resource exporting, 
economies (e.g. Australia, Canada, New Zealand) somewhat 
different needs pertain. The first is that monetary and 
financial constraints should not choke off recovery in the 
central industrial economies and thus prevent revival of 
their expert volumes and prices. The second is continued 
access to credit - preferably at 1 ower real interest rates - 
to allow domestic and export production build-up and to 
increase investment in natural-resource-based production.
NICs ("including Singapore and Hong Kong) have 
similar requirements - albeit their investment credit 
requirements centre on manufacturing and exportable services. 
in addition several (not including Hong Kong and Singapore) 
require restructuring of existing, and injection of new', 
external credit to avert debt crises before global trade 
recovery and falling real interest rates can strengthen 
their external balance positions.
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Very large poor economies with limited - though 
critical - external trade dependence (e.g. India) probably 
need the same things from the international monetary and 
financial system as the NICs albeit their present exposure 
to debt crises is significantly lower. In addition, however, 
they need enhanced investment finance to restructure 
exports and to reduce fuel and food import dependence.
Relatively large and strong poor countries severely 
affected by the post-1978 phase of the global economic crisis 
(e.g. Nigeria, Malaysia, Trinidad and Tobago, Zimbabwe I again have 
partially overlapping and partially differentiable priorities.
In the medium term global trade and industrial economy 
recovery should significantly strengthen their external 
current account position and, therefore, their access 
to long-term finance. However, in the interim some (e.g.
Nigeria) require additional resources to avert an external 
debt and commercial payments crisis and most (notably 
Zimbabwe) bridging finance to sustain the import levels 
necessary to maintain and operate capital stock at levels 
consistent with ability to respond to export revival 
possibilities and to maintain levels of personal consumption 
and public service provision consistent with economic, 
social and political stability. A few relatively resource- 
rich least developed economies (e.g. Botswana, Papua New 
Guinea) are in similar positions.
The balance of the poor and least developed 
economies have significantly different and longer-term 
requirements. Despite significant diversities in other 
respects almost all need additional resource transfers both 
to maintain present real import levels and to restore them 
to the minimum levels consistent with maintaining existing 
production, infrastructure and public service capacity. In 
addition they require major support to restructure produc­
tion toward new exports (their existing ones by and large 
have poor prospects even in the context of global recovery) 
and toward reduction of food and fuel import requirements.
Because their present export to import ratio is low (below 
50 per cent in many cases), their economies badly debilitated 
and their workers, peasants and entrepreneurs often fatal­
istic and passive after the past four or more years' batter­
ing, their requirements for monetary/financial system sup­
port, while initially smaller than those of other economies, 
need to be placed in a longer-term and more concessional 
perspective. Not only is commercial (bank or expor-t) credit 
not readily available to them (except for specific, quick 
pay-off, balance-of-payments improving projects); but two 
years' grace plus eight years' repayment funds at 10 per 
cent interest (and even more so shorter-period, higher- 
cost credits) increase rather than decrease medium-term
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external imbalance as evidenced by the present impact of 
Ib7 8 -I9 8 l commercial bank and export credit use by several 
(e.g. Tanzania, Kenya). Within this category there is a 
special sub-group of economies which have suffered from 
structural malaise for eight years or more as opposed to 
since 1979. These include some specialised mineral 
exporters (e.g. Zambia), countries with a long pattern of 
vacillation and ineffective economic policies (e.g. Ghana 
over 1 9 0 4 - 1 9 8 2 ) and states seeking to recover from socio­
political and political economic disasters (e.g. Uganda).
From these differentiated requirements it. is possible 
to outline a set of goals for interim international monetary 
and financial system management:
1. Avert major international debt crises and 
especially significant defaults;
2 . provide adequate finance to sustain recovery 
and expansion of global trade;
3 - sustain or restore minimum necessary import
levels for economies with particularly severe 
post - 1 9 7 8  (or longer-term in cases 
like Ghana, Guyana, Jamaica, Uganda, Zambia) 
declines in import capacity;
4 . finance rehabilitation and restructuring to
allow external balance to be regained primarily 
through export recovery/expansion and enhanced 
domestic production especially of energy and 
food;
5 - provide financial resource injections on terms 
consistent with meeting the above objectives, 
avoiding massive erosion of basic needs and 
encouraging states to take positive domestic 
action toward regaining external and domestic 
balance within a framework of economic re­
habilitation and restructuring.
Conditionality: Goals, Targets and Timing
Debate about conditionality is rarely about whether 
there should be conditions. The financial support for 
structural adjustment programmes represents a series of 
business transactioiis and all business transactions are 
conditioned by and conditional on actions by all parties 
concerned. The real debate is on the purposes to be served 
(which necessarily alter the conditions), the targets 
appropriate to achieving those purposes, the time required
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for adjustment and the degree of flexibility appropriate in 
targets. One might reasonably presume that each of these 
varies from case to case. For examp]e,an appropriate 
package for a rich manufactured goods exporting economy 
suffering form the impact of recent massi\e demand expansion 
would hardly suit a very poor primary exporter which had 
been unable to reduce demand sufficiently to counteract a 
fifty per cent fall in earned import capacity (and vice 
versa ) .
If maintenance of capital stock and revival of 
production are seen as critical goals, targets positing sharp 
cuts in imports or real levels either of credit to 
productive enterprises or of basic government spending are 
likely to be counterproductive - especially in a very poor 
country which has already experienced substantial declines 
in real household incomes. The same point applies even 
more strongly if maintaining minimum personal consumption 
standards, providing basic public services, avoiding 
increasing (already usually wider than would be tolerated 
in rich Commonwealth countries) income and wealth dispar­
ities and/or allowing political stability without repression 
are seen as among the goals of structural adjustment.
None of this implies that limits to expansion of 
monetary demand (especially when generated by persistent 
recurrent budget imbalance) or short-term external borrow­
ing, or coherent price (including foreign currency price,
i.e. exchange rate) policies are not among the targets 
needed. It may imply that minimum (as well as maximum) 
real wages and maximum (as well as minimum) basic consumer 
goods price increases and also real production of key 
basic consumer ("incentive") goods should also figure among 
the requirements,albeit that is arguable given the problems 
sure to arise from a multiplication of conditions. As 
an intermediate position these could be viewed as parameters 
with which a letter of intent had to be consistent and 
which were the starting point for defining practicable 
monetary and external debt criteria.
Because adjustment programmes tend to impose 
costs before they bring benefits and because very high 
initial costs have a shock impact more likely to shatter 
than to cure a fragile economy, a case exists for more 
front-end loading of external financial support and less 
front-end loading of costly domestic measures. This is 
particularly true with respect to economies with very 
limited potential for rapid export increases, low present 
ratios of exports to imports, substantial post- 1 9 7 ? falls 
in real income and significant deferred maintenance 
deterioration of productive capacity, infrastructure
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and public services. Whatever the potential of very sharp 
shocks for inducing external balance in economies whose 
earnings are substantially from manufactured goods and 
remittances - and the Portuguese and Turkish case records 
are not wholly reassuring even for such economies - they 
are most unlikely to produce either rapid increases in 
production and exports or domestic political and economic 
stability in most low-income economies, e.g. those of sub- 
Saharan Africa.
The exchange rate issue may illustrate this point. 
Highly overvalued currencies are inefficient from any 
economic system's point of view. Many developing country 
currencies are seriously overvalued and becoming more so.
The initial costs of devaluation - especially massive 
devaluation unless the currency has virtually lost all 
value, e.g. by several successive years of near 1 0 0 per 
cent inflation with little or no exchange rate adjustment - 
are massive. The gains are much more lagged and will never 
be achieved if the devaluation shock is transmuted (e.g. 
via fuel and food imports and cost-plus business practice) 
into hyperinflation rapidly crosscancelling the intended 
results of exchange rate adjustment. The costs of standing 
still are serious and cumulative with no likely subsequent 
gains but are less and less open-ended at any one time. 
Pressure for massive front-loaded devaluation - especially 
with no guarantee of massive resource injection - tends to 
freeze the status quo,squeezing put advocates of more 
gradual, phased devaluation while the underlying position 
worsens.
A more practicable - in the sense of achieving 
prompt action toward adjustment, reducing costs of im- 
mobilisme and reducing the risks of shock-induced collapse 
(including into hyperinflation) - approach might in many 
cases include:
1 . phased devaluations of perhaps 1 0 per cent 
each, up to three times a year over two to 
three years;
2 . a package of IMF-Bank-bilateral programme- 
oriented resources allowing enhanced capacity 
utilisation and rehabilitation of capital stock 
to have unit cost reducing and supply enhancing 
impact large enough and soon enough to offset the 
inflationary impact of devaluation;
3. phased reduction of consumer subsidies, increases 
in wages and producer prices, and restoration of 
basic public services (especially education, 
health and water) both to mitigate adjustment
costs for peasants and urban low-income 
groups and to recreate a context in which 
real increases in living standards are 
credible (a necessary incentive for increased 
effort and production).
Similar considerations apply to initial degree, 
phasing and mitigating resource transfers in support of 
other standard IMF criteria. Demanding too much too soon 
usually results in immobilisme while the situation worsens, 
botched compromise programmes hiding a non-meeting of minds 
when written but speedily collapsing in practice and/or 
massive social and political instability. None of these 
makes much sense from a financial institutional, economic 
production or human point of view.
How to set targets poses related but somewhat 
different problems. The projections of any adjustment 
package include assumptions as to external variables - 
from weather through the prices of particular commodities 
to the external resource inflows projected in the programme 
to the state of the world economy - quite beyond the control 
of the state entering into the programme. Further, in 
recent years most such projections - by the IMF, the Bank, 
the OECD and individual industrial economies as much as by 
developing and peripheral economies - have been significant­
ly in error. Under these circumstances failure to achieve 
precisely set targets ("trigger clauses") on precise dates 
based on unstated assumptions tells very little about 
either the efforts of the state in question or the response 
of its economy to the programme package.
While programmes and their targets cannot be 
totally open-ended three modifications of standard target 
setting would seem both appropriate and practicable:
1 . specify the basic assumptions (especially as to 
external determinants) underlying projections 
and targets;
2 . set targets in terms of ranges (both as to 
quantity and as to timing) rather than in 
precise levels at specific dates;
3 . when failure to meet targets can be analytically 
related to external variables worse than 
projection assumptions,revise the programme 
with a view to sustaining it rather than sus­
pending it for target non-fulfillment.
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1 he 1 MF : V r o p o s a l s  I or Improved 1 c on om L c Effectiveness
Even on its own terms the IMF's present and recent 
past performance record is disconcerting. It has inadequate 
resources to meet its requirements^’ it seeks to devise 
short-term programmes to bridge what it admits are often 
medium-term structural gaps; it finds many clients needing 
its services so little persuaded of the validity of its 
prescriptions or the adequacy of its resource injections as 
to stay away; its proposals often seem to lend themselves to im- 
mobilisme and resistance - while underlying conditions 
worsen - rather than dialogue and agreed packages; a 
very high proportion of its programmes break down very soon 
after initial adoption, often because projections in them were 
always marked Ly unrealistic. A merchant banker' with that 
record would have no clients, a commercial banker would have 
been taken over following an emergency central bank lifeboat 
operation and a central bank would have had its management 
replaced. Since none of those options is practicable with 
respect to the IMF, attempts to achieve improved performance 
are critical, especially since a Fund programme is increas­
ingly the necessary cornerstone for any financial recon­
struction or structural adjustment programme. Eight 
significant areas for change can be identified.
The first is the adjustment of conditionality and 
of target setting and use along the lines suggested in the 
preceeding section. A second is lengthening of the maximum 
time frame for programmes where necessary to achieve stable 
structural adj sutment. The maximum drawing period might 
be extended to five years, the period between each drawing 
and initial repayment might be up to five years and re­
payments might be phased over up to seven years. These 
would be máximums; some programmes dealing with 
reversible cyclical imbalances or secondary shocks to 
fairly resilient economies could and should be substantially 
shorter.
The Compensatory Finance Facility should be made 
more effective in terms of its original aim of providing 
resources to cover the initial shock and time to adjust to 
lor reverse) declines in real import capacity. At 
present it meets under half of export shortfalls as 
measured, perhaps a fifth for Africa and still less if the 
shortfall is measured in terms of real import capacity 
not nominal export proceeds. The simplest way to achieve 
this would include totally untying CFF from quotas I or 
raising its limit to 2 5 0 to 3 0 0 per cent of quota), 
calculating shortfalls from an arithmetic not a geometric 
mean, measuring shortfalls in terms of earned import 
capacity not nominal export earnings alone and phasing
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repayment to relate to recovery of import capacity with a 
maximum of five years from drawing to initial repayment and 
seven years for repayment. The positive impact on least 
developed and sub-Saharan African economies of such changes - 
which are entirely consistent with the CFF's initial 
purposes (adopted at a time of much lower average in­
flation and terms-of-trade fluctuations) - would be very 
considerable.
Fourth, low conditionality drawing facilities 
(including a CFF expanded as proposed above) should be 
expanded absolutely and relative to maximum drawing 
limits. High conditionality often deters prompt use of Fund 
resources; the low' conditionality facilities (especially 
the Oil Facility) available in 1974-76 were critical in 
many developing countries' successful 1 9 7 4 - 7 6  adjustment 
programmes and 1 9 7 6 - 7 8  return to external balance and 
domestic growth. Higher average conditionality over 
1 9 7 9 - 8 2  has not resulted in better average programme 
quality, greater borrower commitment to programme goals or 
a lower programme failure rate - on the face of it quite 
the reverse.
To achieve these four goals requires a fifth - 
substantially expanded Fund resources beyond the quota 
increases now in the process of approval. Either another 
5 0 per cent quota increase within two years (which would 
still leave Fund quotas a low proportion of global 
liquidity by 1945-70 standards) or substantial Fund borrow­
ings from members or commercial markets is critical if 
Fund finance is to be adequate in size and adequately 
flexible in repayment period.
For 1ow-income countries - especially those with 
massive structural current account deficits likely to 
require at least a decade to close - interest rate subsidies 
remain critical . Present Fund resources in this respect 
are fully committed and need to .be replenished (and made 
applicable to low-income country EFF and CFF drawings). 
Possible means include profits from further sales of IMF 
gold, Trust Fund loan repayments and/or donations by richer 
IMF members.
Given the reduction of international liquidity of 
a majority of IMF members since 1979^ a substantial new issue 
of SDRs over 1984-87 would seem appropriate. If the ratio 
of SDRs to total reserves which existed after the initial 
allocation period ended in 1 9 7 - were to be restored this 
would require annual allocations of SDR 10 to 12 billion 
for three years. To maximise the contribution to avoiding 
debt crises and sustaining global trade recovery it would be
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helpful if industrial economy IMF members were to waive at 
Least half of their allocations in favour of poorer IMF 
members and of IDA and Regional Development Banks.
Finally the IMF should reflect on a message which 
has been stressed by the Bank but is also implicit in 
much of its own analysis. Policy changes without adequate 
resource backing are unlikely to achieve rapid or large 
economic results. Indeed in the poorest or most severely 
damaged economies additional external resource injections 
are often a precondition to instituting and carrying through 
structural policy adjustments at all. The IMF should there­
fore seek more often and more energetically to secure Bank 
and bilateral funding in support of IMF country programmes 
to increase the pay-off from, and reduce the short-term 
costs of, sticking to agreed policy changes. It has 
recently done so on several major middle-income country 
programmes with major related commercial credit restructur­
ing and expansion. It may be even more critical to play a 
similar role with respect to low-income country structural 
adjustment programmes for which substantial, prompt, com­
plementary Bank and bilateral concessional finance are 
usually critical.
World Bank Group Lending: Desirable Structural Adjustments
World Bank group finance is critical to a signifi­
cant number of developing countries. For the less poor the 
regular Bank window is appropriate and to date has been 
able to sustain increases in real disbursements and interest 
rates which - while historically high - are lower than 
those of purely commercial financial institutions. For the 
deeply poor economies - particularly those of India, 
sub-Saharan Africa and China - it is the International 
Development Association (IDA) which is crucial because 
they require a significant proportion of resource inflows 
on highly concessional terms. This is the case because of 
both limited domestic short-term capacity to generate 
debt service finance and external balance constraints on 
ability to remit it. The latter constraint is often the 
more binding. As the Bank's independent review of IDA has 
shown, on average projects supported by IDA credits have 
had a 21 per cent rate of return. IDA faces more severe 
resource constraints than the main window of the Bank and 
is in real danger of substantial reductions in future real 
resource transfers.
While the Bank has taken initiatives in programme 
lending and on two-way policy dialogue with recipients 
based on analysis of their problems, serious shortcomings - 
apparently substantially reducible in the short run -
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exist with respect to both. Bank/IDA programme (including 
Structural Adjustment and Bal anee-- of- Payment s Support) 
lending is limited to 10 per* cent of total group lending. 
Especially with respect to the least developed countries 
this limit is open to the Brandt Commission's 1983 warning: 
"Programmes of agricultural development, education and other 
poverty-oriented investment on the required scale cannot 
succeed if international assistance is confined largely 
to the capital cost of projects." Bank policy dialogues - 
especially at public level and when expressed generally 
(as in Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa ) -
have at times had a tendency to become monologues (at least 
if the Bank member actually wanted substantial augmentation 
of Bank resource flows), overemphasise the speed and effici­
ency of responses to price signals in the very imperfect 
markets of poor economies and seriously overgeneral ise 
the causes and consequences of, and possible routes to 
emerge from, present economic crises. Indeed in at least 
a few cases the Bank has made its lending more conditional 
than the Fund, rejecting structural adjustment programme 
proposals whose acceptance had been integral to projections 
in agreed Fund programmes.
Several steps - both by and for the Bank - are 
needed to strengthen its performance over 1983-1987- 
The first is a rapid agreement on the Vllth IDA replenish­
ment at a level allowing significant increases in real per 
capita credits ovei 1 9 8 4 / 8 5  - 1986-87- Allowing for about 
5 per cent annual inflation, 3 per cent annual population 
growth and a 20 per cent increase in real per capita terms 
over 1 9 8 3 / 8 4  (target $3-7 billion) would require average 
annual disbursements of $5-5 to 5-75 billion.
Additional borrowing authority for the Bank proper 
is also needed, if a little less urgently. The most prac­
ticable route would seem to be to raise the borrowing limit 
from its present 1 to 1 ratio with guaranteed capital to 2 
to 1, a ratio far below those of commercial banks, whose
ratios are usually between 1 5 to 1 and 20 to 1 and which
have higher proportions of "non-performing" loans than the 
Bank,
Programme finance's maximum share in total lending
should be raised from a tenth to a third (or to 30 per cent
as recommended by the Brandt Commission). Especially for 
IDA clients a 9 to 1 ratio of project to structural adjust­
ment and balance-of-payments support finance is quite 
inappropriate at present. For several 1 to 1 would seem 
much more apposite.
The Bank should reconsider its relationship to IMF 
programmes in several respects:
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a. in terms of its own longer time horizon and 
therefore ability to push support packages
up to - say - five years' duration from t he three 
covered by the Fund;
b. as well as in terms of its own mere supply 
side, developmental and poverty elimination 
focus and, therefore, the provision of 
resources designed to minimise costs of Initial 
IMF package measures on these goals;
c. and in timing, e.g. conducting Structural 
Adjustment Programme negotiations in parallel 
with (rather than largely subsequent to) Fund 
negotiations to allow rapid real resource 
transfers following programme adoption to 
minimise its real cost and maximise its chances 
of success. (These points apply to bilateral 
donors as well.)
The Bank should conduct its policy dialogue with 
members rather more flexibly, with more attention to varying 
contexts, doing rather more careful listening and with a 
greater willingness to admit that it can be, and has been, 
wrong on occasion. The last point is critical in the not 
insignificant number of cases in which a not insubstantial 
portion of present problems flows from following Bank and 
Bank-related technical assistance personnel's advice (quite 
possibly advice the Bank would not now repeat); only a frank 
admission of error on both sides lays a basis for mutual 
confidence, absence of recrimination, serious exploration 
of what went wrong and why or faith in new Bank prescrip­
tions and proposals as better than their predecessors.
Bilateral and EEC Concessional Transfer Improvement
For most poor countries bilateral aid is critical 
not simply to 1 ong-term capital stock development but to 
mobilising the minimum volume of resources necessary to 
halt and reverse their current economic decline. The 
implications for aid apply to volume, allocation among 
countries, flexibility in use, speed of disbursement 
and coordination. Most apply at least as strongly to 
European Economic Community as to bilateral concessional 
financial transfers.
More concessional transfers are needed. With the 
apparent beginning of economic recovery from very high 
levels of unutilised capacity and unemployment such increases 
on a coordinated basis by DAC members should be possible.
Many industrial economies (albeit not all) are about to
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enter periods of reduced budgetary imbalance, most are 
willing to use resources to sustain export expansion, and 
few can reasonably fear that modest stimulus to demand 
concentrated on food, basic intermediate goods (including 
fertiliser, chemicals and steel) and capital goods ( includ­
ing transport equipment) could be basically inflationary 
as opposed to output enhancing and capacity utilising in 
some of their hardest hit sectors and regions.
Whatever the quant ity a higher proportion of 
concessional transfers should go to low-income and especially 
least developed countries. (At present about half still 
goes to middle-income countries.) These countries neither 
have access to, nor can they afford to use, substantial 
commercial finance but are precisely the economies most 
likely to continue to deteriorate despite giobai recovery 
unless they can secure more external finance.
The uses of aid should be made more flexible and 
more relevant to the recipients' context. At present a 
high proportion of all project aid to the least developed 
(and sub-Saharan African more generally,) countries is 
counterproductive. It creates productive units requiring 
imported inputs and spares when there is inadequate 
foreign exchange to cover these items for existing units, 
puts new infrastructure in place while foreign exchange 
constraints cause existing infrastructure to deteriorate 
for lack of maintenance, builds up health and education 
capital stock when lack of books, drugs, paper and equipment 
prevents proper use or maintenance of what already exists 
and eats up nationally earned foreign exchange by failing 
to cover indirect foreign exchange costs or the external 
components of cost over-runs which - not surprisingly 
given recent rates of inflation - have been as endemic in 
the South as in the North. To be useful such aid should 
either be complemented by, or partially switched to, 
programmes supporting maintenance and capacity utilisation 
in key production (e.g. exports; food, basic incentive 
goods), infrastructure (e.g. power, transport) and public 
services (e.g. health, education, water) sectors. In many 
of the least developed countries only key export restruc­
turing, absolute import reducing and bottleneck breaking 
projects should be begun or continued; the basic focus 
should be on sustaining and rehabilitating what already 
exists.
This is not to decry all projects now, much less 
once recovery and structural adjustment begin to take hold.
It is to argue that under present circumstances the con­
tinued dominance of this element in aid programmes is often 
economically counterproductive. Neither is it to call for
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open-ended grants of foreign exchange. Rehabilitation, 
output maintenance, bridging finance or local cost pro­
grammes (or projects if that terminology is preferred) 
can be just as target-related and conditional as project 
aid. For example a road transport rehabilitation pro­
gramme/project can be defined quite precisely in terms of 
maintenance equipment and spares, construction materials, 
vehicle spares, workshop equipment, training and skilled 
personnel. Similarly import support can be related 
directly to sub-sectors (e.g. health, basic consumer 
goods, inputs into export production and processing) 
and categories of goods (e.g. WHO basic drug list 
pharmaceuticals; textile mill spares, dyes, chemicals; 
fertilisers and pesticides).
Given the rapidly deteriorating situation of many 
poor economies speed of disbursement needs to be enhanced. 
This is especially true with respect to programme support 
as discussed above^, which can and should be - but is not 
always in practice - quick disbursing.
Better coordination of concessional financial flows 
is needed - especially if a major proportion is rehabili­
tation and payments support finance tied by sector and 
product. Because coordination by donors (especially the 
World Bank) arouses recipient fears of external manipu­
lation both recipients and "innocent bystander" inter­
national bodies should be encouraged to take more initia­
tives toward coordination. Zimbabwe's convening of 
Zimcord exemplifies the first approach and some of UNCTAD's 
sub-regional least developed country/potential resource 
transferrer meetings the second.
EEC resource transfers have historically been 
particularly project tied, inflexible in use and slow 
disbursing. Two immediate opportunities for improvement 
exist. The first is to expand the proportion of 
rehabilitation and maintenance projects as such and similar 
components in other projects (e.g. the road motor vehicle 
and coffee development projects in Tanzania respectively). 
Secondly, because each EDF is funded on a commitment not 
a disbursement basis, the EEC had built up a very substan­
tial backlog of unused appropriations. This balance should - 
on the basis of consultat ions between the EEC and the ACP - 
be allocated to eighteen to twenty-four month rehabilitation 
and sectoral import support programmes with the ongoing 
project commitments to be met out of EDF VII ("Lome III") 
funds. Such an initiative - preferably negotiated in 
1983/84 but if necessary as part of "Lome III" - could 
have a very substantial output and export sustaining impact 
for many of the ACP economies over the next two years^
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precisely when strains on them are greatest before global 
trade recovery gives them any significant relief.
Commercial Credit Flows and Structures
Commercial credit - including government-guaranteed 
export credits - is in fact much larger as to stocks and, 
especially, flows than IMF-Bank-aid finance combined. 
Therefore its role, especially its potential negative role, 
in overcoming the immediate threats to the stability of 
the international monetary/financial system and to the 
strength and sustainability of the nascent recovery in 
global trade and production, will be critical. With the 
exception of state-guaranteed export credit, commercial 
credit is less directly and detailedly subject to govern­
ment and intergovernmental control than other sources. 
However, the leverage over it possessed by treasuries and 
central banks of major industrial economies and by the 
IMF should not be underestimated. Four general recommen­
dations would appear both desirable and practicable.
First, that banks avoid trying to reduce overall 
exposure (except as part of an agreed adjustment package) 
since the net result is likely to be increased risk of 
severe losses and of blocking trade recovery. This 
requires coordinated action by governments, central banks 
and the IMF to deter individual cut-and-run tactics 
(such as those which have greatly increased the cash 
flow strain on the Brazilian programme) and, when necessary, 
to find additional finance from other banks to replace 
that withdrawn.
Second, to provide selective additional credit to 
gain time for recovery of exports and debt service capacity 
when serious restructuring is proceeding (e.g. Mexico) and/ 
or global trade recovery and real interest rate declines 
should have a substantial positive impact (e.g. Brazil, 
Nigeria).
Third, to avoid providing short-term finance, 
including export credit^ for purposes not leading to rapid, 
positive balance-of-payments impact. Loans and credits 
for such items as international airports and new capitals 
(e.g. Tanzania) and for real civil service wage increases 
in the face of falling export earnings (e.g. Mauritius) 
have increased, not lessened, the present problems of both 
lenders and borrowers whatever the long-term economic or 
short-term political virtues of the expenditures.
Fourth, restructure the debt profile to 1engthen 
average maturity and reduce early redemption (or rollover)
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regui rements. Such restructuring should be made both Less 
traumatic and less burdened with higher interest rates 
and fees which - whatever their virtues for bank accounts 
in the short-term - increase borrower burdens to a degree 
raising the likelihood of repetitive debt crises and pot­
ential write-offs.
Sout h-Sout h Possi bi111 ies
Because asymmetry is one of the basic probLems of 
the present international monetary and financial system 
it would be short-sighted to ignore the necessity for 
South-South action - whether regionally or more generally. 
However, given the severity of the post-1978 crises' impact 
on almost all developing economies (not excluding oil— 
exporters) it would be unrealistic to view the short-term 
possibilities for such action as central even to the econ­
omies directly concerned much less to Commonwealth economies 
in general or the global monetary/financial system.
Better payments arrangements - including direct 
banking, insurance and related financial service links as 
well as more narrowly defined clearing and credit agree­
ments - can provide some of the . lubrication for enhanced 
South-South trade especially on a regional basis. Even 
in a very poor region such as that of the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference (including Botswana, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
together with Angola and Mozambique) significant surplus 
capacity exists or is about to exist in one or more states 
for over 75 basic types of manufactured goods or basic 
inputs of which one or more member states is a significant 
importer form third countries. Among the obstacles to 
bringing that capacity into use by regional trade is the 
lack of intraregional financial institution linkages and 
payments arrangements.
Despite - or in some cases partly because of - 
the present trade and payments crises there is scope for 
expanded South-South export credit arrangements. Those of 
Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela and Mexico with 
respect to oil and of India w'ith respect to capital goods 
are relevant. Where such credit both enhances present 
exports of the lender (and has a cash-flow element enough 
to cover immediate foreign exchange costs) and allows the 
borrower to maintain or restore import levels for critical 
commodities it can contribute significantly to mutual 
economic recovery.
Financing of bilateral aid programmes and of 
regional development institutions by financially stronger
South economies is clearly desirable but - given the 
reduced number and liquidity of such economies - unlikely 
to expand in real terms until global recovery improves the 
potential resource transferrer's external balance position.
Export finance rediscounting facilities to allow 
national ex port credit agencies (which guarantee the exporter 
payment in local currency) to secure foreign exchange would 
be highly desirable. While perhaps most logically organised 
on a regional basis^institutions to guarantee and market 
such paper will need members with substantial external 
financial resources among their members both as "in house" 
purchasers and credible guarantors. Ideally this member­
ship would come from other South economies. In the interim 
such export credit rediscount schemes, like regional 
clearing arrangements and export credit schemes, deserve 
consideration because they could act as effective channels 
for transferring resources from the North and thereby 
encourage recovery.
Resume: Toward a Beginning
The measures suggested above are not adequate to 
achieve long-term reform of the international monetary 
and financial system. Their goals are substantially 
more modest:
a. to reduce the risk of debt crises debilitating 
already weak national economies and aborting 
global economic recovery;
b. to allow the halting and reversal of fhe 
economic deterioration triggered by rapid 
falls in real import capacity which afflict a 
large number of low-income economies;
c. to strengthen the international financial flows 
basis for sustained- recovery in global trade 
and production.
To achieve those goals requires measures which are 
consistent with broadly agreed economic goals and purposes, 
do not require major amendments to the basic articles of 
international institutions and do not propose huge net 
increases in concessional and international agency 
(including non-concessional Fund and semi-concessional Bank 
programme) resources which would need to be financed by 
national budgets. The foregoing proposals do in large 
measure meet these tests. All could be included within the 
present broad framework of Fund, Bank, bilateral, EEC 
and commercial bank programmes. While most require some
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government resources or guarantees the totals involved are 
not massive relative either to the total GDP of industrial 
economies or to the gains they would derive from sustained 
recovery and growth of international trade. Though some 
of the specific proposals are controversial none is 
particularly radical, unique to the author, bereft of a 
broad range of analytical and business/political support 
or even very novel. Their possible merit is as a package 
of mutually reinforcing measures appropriate to the 
present context of avoiding crises and declines which would 
rekindle 1909-82 recession (and 1970-82 depression) and 
of strengthening, generalising and sustaining nascent, 
recoveries now apparently beginning in several key 
economies (e.g. USA and UK).
In addition to advocating selective increases in 
financial resource availability, the proposals also stress 
the importance of greater flexibility in relating transfer 
use to immediate and structural priorities which vary 
widely among countries; of revising conditionality not to 
make it "easier" but more relevant to a wider range of 
genuine economic goals (including socio-political stability 
and absolute poverty reduction); and of being more realistic 
in relating target setting and achievement as well as 
programme disbursement, grace and repayment periods to 
what is objectively possible, to costs involved and to 
external influences (negative or positive) outside initial 
projections and borrower control. These changes are po­
tentially as important as real resource enhancement - 
to which they are complementary - because viewed objectively 
present monetary and financial transfers (loan or grant, 
concessional or commercial) are constrained in ways which 
greatly reduce their effectiveness at halting economic 
decline, averting external balance (more accurately im­
balance) crises and facilitating global recovery in trade 
and production.
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